

# Defeating Spread Spectrum Communication with Software Defined Radio

Michael Ossmann  
Great Scott Gadgets

EDSC 2013

# Spread Spectrum Communication


using more RF  
bandwidth than  
necessary in exchange  
for some benefit

"bandwidth"

width (in Hz) of the  
range of frequency  
components of  
a signal



# bandwidth



# Spread Spectrum Benefits

"the establishment of secure communications, increasing resistance to natural interference, noise and jamming, to prevent detection, and to limit power flux density"

- Wikipedia

FHSS

~~DSSS~~



# Software Defined Radio (SDR)

radio implemented with  
Digital Signal Processing  
(DSP)



# HackRF Jawbreaker

6 December 2012

<http://greatscottgadgets.com/hackrf/>



# HackRF

20 MHz bandwidth

30 MHz to 6 GHz  
operating frequency

portable

open source hardware

Defeat

detect

eavesdrop

inject

jam

FHSS

Frequency Hopping

Spread Spectrum

Secret Frequencies

Nevil Maskelyne

VS.

Guglielmo Marconi

1903



"I can tune my instruments so that no other instrument that is not similarly tuned can tap my messages."

—Marconi

"There was a young  
fellow of Italy  
who diddled the public  
quite prettily."

-Maskelyne

# Nikola Tesla

1903 patent: "Method of Signaling"

"without any danger of the signals or messages being disturbed, intercepted, interfered with in any way."

George Antheil  
and  
Hedy Lamarr

1942 patent:

"Secret Communication  
System"

player piano  
mechanism



FHSS Today

Classic Bluetooth

Bluetooth Low Energy  
(aka Bluetooth Smart)

802.11 FHSS

proprietary  
systems

Defeating FHSS

hop-along

all channels

intentional  
aliasing

# Hop-along

Can implement without

SDR: **ubertooth**  
**hedyattack**

hopping sequence predicted  
from sparse observations

# All Channels

SDR can transmit or receive on many channels simultaneously

eavesdrop or jam without predicting hopping sequence





ALTERA  
Cyclone IV  
EP4CE10K-2FC208  
10K10-2FC208  
10K10-2FC208  
10K10-2FC208

USB-TO-UART  
BRIDGE

Daisho  
07 May 2013

<http://greatscottgadgets.com/daisho/>

# Intentional Aliasing

Building an All-Channel  
Bluetooth Monitor

Ossmann and Spill


ShmooCon 2009

# Aliasing




analog  
frequencies

digital  
frequencies




# Anti-aliasing Filter

A B C D E




C

# Intentional Aliasing








HackRF Jawbreaker


6 December 2012

<http://greatscottgadgets.com/>

# Without Aliasing



With Aliasing



# HackRF

maximum filter  
bandwidth: 30.8 MHz

great for FHSS  
in the 902 to 928  
MHz ISM band

# FHSS Defeated





Can detect, eavesdrop,  
inject, and jam with  
any of the three  
techniques (but I  
don't recommend TX  
with intentional aliasing)



DSSS


Direct Sequence  
Spread Spectrum

More bps  $\rightarrow$  Wider Bandwidth




A Bunch of Chips for Every Bit

to send 1:



to send 0:



1 Mbps  $\rightarrow$  11 M chips/s

# Correlation



x



=



multiply

accumulate

(11)

# DSSS Examples

802.11 b/g (especially  
management frames)


802.15.4 (ZigBee)

GPS

proprietary systems



# Spotting DSSS



# Wideband Jamming

DSSS immune to  
narrowband jamming  
but vulnerable to  
wideband jamming

SDR can do either  
and can transmit random codes

# Weak Signal Detection

"below the  
noise floor"

directional  
antennas

math

multiple antennas



80%

spot  
CONNECT




# Code Determination

code needed for  
eavesdropping and  
injection

auto correlation



# Insufficient Bandwidth



## 3 Air Interface

The STX2 complies with the following air interface specifications:

### 3.1 Modulation

#### 3.1.1 *Description*

The information data bit shall be XOR-ed with a pseudo random sequence (PN code) to create a DSSS waveform.

The PN sequence is the following maximal length sequence:

- 255 chip PN sequence

PN chip transitions are synchronized with the RF carrier transitions.


The nominal PN rate is 1.25 Mcps with a nominal Bit Rate of 100.04 bps.

#### 3.1.2 *Quality*

The EVM (Error Vector Magnitude) is less than 15 % RMS for 1020 symbols. This corresponds to an RMS phase error of less than 18 degrees and a magnitude error of less than 10%.

The unit of service of the STX2 is a message. Depending on the length of a message, a message may be split in several Air Interface Packets. The STX2 manages the function of the on-air protocol, so users need not concern themselves much with this section except to understand how the STX performs its function for design timing considerations.

The Air Interface Packet structure is as follows (the preamble is transmitted first). User data is concatenated with housekeeping information to create an Air Interface Packet.




**Figure 4, Packet On-Air Structure**

**Table 1, Air Interface Packet Fields**

|                    |                                                                                                                                                                        |
|--------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Preamble (10)      | Consists of the 10-bit binary bit pattern 0000001011<br>Leftmost bit is sent first                                                                                     |
| STX ID (26)        | 3 bits for manufacturer ID (000) and 23 bits for unit ID                                                                                                               |
| Message Number (4) | Message number modulo 16. The message number of the last message transmitted shall be saved in non-volatile memory<br>This number is NOT reset upon new configuration. |
| Packet Number (4)  | Number of packets in a message. This is used for messages longer                                                                                                       |

# Insufficient Bandwidth



# DSSS Defeated

can detect,  
eavesdrop, inject,  
and jam



# Spread Spectrum Communication

not for  
security

# Questions

<http://greatscottgadgets.com/>